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ABSTRACT 
The stock market appreciates by an average of 24 percent in real dollar terms when 
countries attempt to stabilize annual inflation rates that are greater than 40 percent.  In 
contrast, the average market response is 0 when the pre-stabilization rate of inflation is 
less than 40 percent.  These results suggest that the potential long-run benefits of 
stabilization may dominate short-run costs at high levels of inflation, but at low to 
moderate levels of inflation, benefits may be offset by costs in a present value sense.  
Stock market responses also help predict the change in inflation and output in the year 
following all 81 stabilization efforts. 
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Larry Summers argues that there is an absence of sound research on major questions that 
fall between standard finance and economics approaches (Summers, 1985).  Almost 
twenty years later, his contention still rings true with respect to issues of disinflation and 
the stock market.  A large literature in finance studies the effect of inflation on stock 
returns (Fama and Schwert (1977), Fama (1981), Modigliani and Cohn (1979), Schwert 
(1981)).  But none of these papers analyzes stock market responses to disinflation 
programs.  When a government announces the start of a disinflation program, it signals 
its intention to significantly cut the rate of inflation.  There is no better setting for 
determining whether inflation affects stock returns.  If inflation matters, then stock prices 
should immediately reflect the news that future inflation will be lower than its current 
level. 
On the other hand, a large literature in macroeconomics studies the social cost of 
disinflation (Friedman (1968), Lucas (1973), Okun (1978), Phelps (1968), Tobin (1972)).  
Yet none of these papers or subsequent ones in this tradition make use of stock prices.  
Instead, macroeconomists assess the social cost of disinflation by constructing the 
sacrifice ratio (Ball (1994), Fischer (1986), Gordon (1982), Okun (1978)).  The sacrifice 
ratio measures the short-run cost of reducing inflation as the sum of undiscounted output 
losses over some horizon.  This approach assumes that there are long-run benefits to 
reducing inflation without making them explicit in a cost-benefit calculation.  Therefore, 
sacrifice-ratio-based analyses do not tell us whether the benefits of disinflation outweigh 
the costs. 
In contrast, the net present value analysis of disinflation introduced here focuses 
attention on the central issue: Do the benefits of reducing inflation outweigh the costs?  
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Changes in stock prices reflect both revised expectations about future corporate profits 
and the discount rate at which those profits are capitalized.  Contractionary measures 
taken to reduce inflation may raise discount rates and reduce profits in the short run.  But 
the reduction in inflation may increase future profits and reduce discount rates.  The stock 
market response to an unanticipated announcement of a disinflation program removes the 
temporal dimension of the analysis by collapsing the entire expected future stream of 
disinflation costs and benefits into a single summary statistic: the expected net benefit 
(current and future) of the program. 
The average unanticipated stock market response associated with the 81 
disinflation episodes studied in this paper is estimated empirically using standard event 
study technology.  The results show that stock markets appreciate by an average of 24 
percent in real dollar terms when countries attempt to stabilize annual inflation that is 
high (above 40 percent).  In contrast, the average market response is zero if the pre-
stabilization inflation rate is moderate (below 40 percent).  Stock market responses also 
help predict the change in inflation and output in the year following all stabilization 
efforts.   
The results are not sensitive to the particular definitions of high and moderate 
inflation, which are taken from Easterly (1996) and Dornbusch and Fischer (1993).  The 
same conclusion is also reached for stock market responses conditional on alternative 
classifications of high and moderate inflation. 
Reporting the results in real dollar terms requires caution, however.  In countries 
with high inflation, the rate of depreciation of the official nominal exchange rate may not 
keep pace with inflation.  Under such a scenario, the real dollar value of the stock market 
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may become artificially inflated.  To account for this possibility, the central estimations 
are also performed using real local-currency stock returns.  They yield the same result.  
The stock market responds in a positive and statistically significant manner when a 
country attempts to stabilize high inflation, but there is no significant market response if 
the pre-stabilization inflation rate is moderate.   
It is important to know whether this result is driven by variation in the types of 
stabilization policies used in high versus moderate inflation.  The data suggest that this is 
not the case.  Sixty-nine of the 81 stabilization programs studied in this paper are 
identified by IMF agreements.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been 
criticized in recent years for the uniformity of its policy prescriptions in all country 
agreements, irrespective of differences in initial macroeconomic conditions and in 
country-specific idiosyncrasies (Corden (1998)).  The homogeneity of the Fund’s 
stabilization prescriptions across countries suggests that there are not major differences 
between the packages of stabilization policies pursued in the high and moderate inflation 
subsamples.   
If countries attempt to reduce inflation without help from the IMF, however, then 
they may pursue stabilization policies that differ significantly from those prescribed by 
the Fund.  For example, 12 of the 81 stabilization episodes studied in this paper did not 
involve an official agreement with the IMF.  All 12 of these programs were directed at 
stabilizing high inflation.  In eight of these 12 episodes, countries attempted to stabilize 
inflation by fixing the nominal exchange rate.  In contrast, none of the IMF episodes 
involved exchange-rate-based stabilizations (ERBS).  Furthermore, there is an extensive 
literature that demonstrates that the short-run real effects of ERBS differ substantially 
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from those observed in more traditional stabilization programs, such as those pursued by 
the Fund (Végh (1992), Calvo and Végh (1998), Fischer, Sahay, and Végh (2002)).  
Therefore, it is important to investigate whether the differential stock market responses 
are driven by differences between IMF and non-IMF stabilization policies.  Various 
robustness checks in Section II suggest that this is not the case.   
After grappling with concerns about robustness, Section III turns to the issue of 
how to interpret the central result.  Stabilizing high inflation increases the present value 
of shareholders’ claims, whereas stabilizing moderate inflation has no effect.  The 
principle question is:  Do the results imply that stabilizing high inflation increases the 
present value of aggregate output, while stabilizing moderate inflation does not?  This 
question must be addressed with caution.  Stabilizing inflation could increase capital’s 
share in Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  In turn, increasing capital’s share in GDP could 
generate higher future profits (and therefore stock prices), even if stabilization has no 
effect on GDP levels or growth rates.  Therefore, we cannot conclude that stabilizing high 
inflation increases the present value of aggregate output.  More generally, conclusions 
about the effect of disinflation on the present value of aggregate output cannot be inferred 
directly from the stock market responses.   
Accordingly, Section III of the paper pursues a narrower question.  Do stock 
market responses to disinflation announcements rationally forecast future outcomes for 
the economy, apart from the publicly traded corporate sector?  Two approaches are 
employed.  To the extent that the stock market responses reflect the expected change in 
the present value of profits from stabilizing inflation, they should have some predictive 
power for the ex-post change in inflation.  Hence, the first approach asks whether the 
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stock market responses help predict future changes in inflation.  The second approach 
explores whether the stock market responses help predict future changes in GDP growth.  
While these two approaches do not provide definitive evidence, the stock market 
responses do help predict the change in inflation and output in the year following efforts 
to stabilize both high and moderate inflation.  This additional result indicates that the 
stock market evidence for the 81 inflation stabilization programs studied here is not 
spurious. 
 
I. Data and Descriptive Findings 
The data construction involves three steps: country selection and assembly of the 
raw data; identification of disinflation announcements; and classification of the level of 
inflation at the time the announcements were made. 
The sample includes all countries that (1) have publicly available stock market 
data and (2) have undertaken at least one disinflation since their stock market data 
became readily available.  The 21 countries that satisfy both criteria are Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and 
Zimbabwe.  The principal source of stock market data is the International Finance 
Corporation’s (IFC) Emerging Markets Data Base (EMDB).  Stock price indices for 
individual countries are the dividend-inclusive, U.S. dollar-denominated IFC Global 
Index.  For most countries, EMDB’s coverage begins in December 1975, but for others 
coverage only begins in December 1984.  For those countries for which the IFC does not 
provide stock market data, the analysis uses the share price index given in the IMF’s 
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International Financial Statistics (IFS).  Each country’s U.S. dollar-denominated stock 
price index is deflated by the U.S. consumer price index (CPI), which comes from the 
IFS.  All of the data are monthly.  The consumer price index for each country is also 
obtained from the IFS.  Returns and inflation are calculated as the first difference of the 
natural logarithm of the real stock price and CPI, respectively.   
The announcement month and year of the 81 disinflation programs are identified 
using two sources.  The first source of event dates is Calvo and Végh (1998).  They 
identify the best-known programs that received a great deal of attention in the literature 
on inflation stabilization.  The second source is the Annual Reports of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  These reports are used to construct a time series of months in 
which each of the 21 countries effectively announced their intention to stabilize by 
signing an official agreement with the IMF.   
IMF programs typically call for current account stabilization in addition to 
inflation stabilization.  The dual stabilization objectives of these programs do not 
introduce important biases into the dating procedure.  The macroeconomic targets in IMF 
programs are generated by the IMF’s Financial Programming Model, which is based on 
the monetary approach to the balance of payments.1  Under the monetary approach, 
balance of payments problems originate from an excess supply of money, with 
monetization of the government deficit typically seen as the proximate cause of the 
excess supply.  The IMF requires that countries reduce both the fiscal deficit and the 
growth rate of the money supply in order to stabilize their current account.  Thus, the 
prescription for stabilizing the current account is tantamount to a traditional disinflation 
program. 
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Including the recent IMF agreements in Mexico in 1995, Asia in 1997, Russia in 
1998, and Brazil in 1999 would strengthen the central findings of this paper, because 
these countries were experiencing moderate inflation and stock prices collapsed during 
the months leading up to their agreements with the IMF.  Nevertheless, these episodes are 
excluded from the sample for two reasons.  First, Dornbusch (1998a) argues that the 
synopsis of stabilization outlined in the preceding paragraph does not provide an accurate 
description of these recent episodes.  He argues that the recent episodes were not inflation 
crises per se, but financial crises; the proximate cause was country balance sheets whose 
assets and liabilities were misaligned with respect to both maturity structure and currency 
denomination.  Second, as part of these recent agreements, the IMF has imposed major 
structural and institutional reforms in addition to insisting on its traditional short-run 
stabilization objectives (Feldstein (1998)). 
High inflation episodes are defined as in Easterly (1996) and Bruno and Easterly 
(1998): 12-month inflation in excess of 40 percent during each of the 24 months leading 
up to and including the month in which the stabilization was announced.  Moderate 
inflation episodes are defined analogously: 12-month inflation between 10 and 40 percent 
during each of the 24 months leading up to and including the month in which the 
stabilization was announced.  This definition of moderate inflation corresponds closely to 
that of Dornbusch and Fischer (1993). 
Table A1 in the Appendix provides extensive details about all of the inflation 
stabilization programs identified using both data sources.  The following is a partial 
summary of those data.  Fourteen of the 81 disinflation announcements correspond to the 
beginning of Calvo and Végh (1998) episodes.  Two of the fourteen Calvo and Végh 
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episodes coincided with IMF agreements Mexico in 1977 and Argentina in 1991.  
Thirteen of the 25 attempts at stabilizing high inflation have official IMF sponsorship, 
and seven succeeded in reducing high inflation to moderate inflation.  Seventeen of the 
25 episodes occurred in Argentina and Brazil.  All 56 of the attempts at stabilizing 
moderate inflation have official IMF sponsorship, and five succeeded in reducing 
moderate inflation to low inflation. 
 
A.  Descriptive Findings 
There are two key questions about the relationship between the stock market 
response to the announcement of a stabilization program and the pre-stabilization level of 
inflation.  First, does the magnitude of the stock market response increase or decrease as 
a function of the level of initial inflation?  Second, what is the sign of the stock market 
response and does the sign depend on the level of inflation?   
 
A.1.  Is the Market Response an Increasing Function of Ex-Ante Inflation? 
Figure 1 provides a rough empirical answer to the first question: The net benefits 
of stabilization appear to be an increasing function of the level of ex-ante inflation.  
Month “0” is defined as the month in which a given stabilization program is announced.  
The IFC records the value of a country’s stock market index at the end of the month.  The 
data on stabilization events do not provide the day of the month on which programs are 
announced.  These facts imply that the announcement of a given stabilization program 
may occur after the day of the month on which the IFC recorded prices.  In such cases, 
the change in the stock market index in month [0] may not reflect the news of the 
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stabilization event.  Accordingly, Figure 1 plots the unadjusted cumulative change in the 
real dollar value of the stock market index in months [0, +1] against the average 12-
month inflation rate over the two years prior to the announcement.  Figure 1 suggests that 
the two-month stock price change is an increasing function of the ex-ante inflation rate.  
The higher the ex-ante inflation rate, the greater the stock price response when a 
stabilization program is announced. 
The positive linear relationship apparent in Figure 1 is given by the following 
regression equation (robust t-statistics in parentheses, =0.10, N=81): 
                                                            (1) 
                                               (1.4)   (1.9).   
The unconditional relationship is statistically significant, but the relationship is 
also noisy.  There are a number of high inflation episodes for which the actual stock price 
change is close to zero.  Explanations for these outliers are considered in Section III.A. 
 
A.2.  Is the Sign of the Response Uniform Across All Ranges of Ex-Ante Inflation? 
 
Figure 1 shows that, on average, the expected net benefits of stabilizing appear to 
be roughly zero near the origin, but are often positive at high levels of inflation.  Table I 
investigates this feature of the data for three different groupings of the 81 stabilization 
episodes based on levels of average inflation prior to announcement.  The first grouping 
corresponds to the Bruno and Easterly (1998) classification of high versus moderate 
inflation; the second simply divides the total sample into two groups of equal size: high 
inflation (40 cases) and moderate inflation (41 cases).  The third comparison splits the 
sample into three groups of equal size: high inflation (27 cases), moderate inflation (27 
cases), and low inflation (27 cases). The alternative classification schemes are useful for 
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checking whether the results are sensitive to the Bruno and Easterly inflation 
classification.  In particular, the two-way numerical split creates a superset of the Bruno 
and Easterly high inflation episodes that is not dominated by Argentina and Brazil.  
Seventeen of the 25 Bruno and Easterly high inflation episodes are in Argentina and 
Brazil.   
The first three rows of Table I report summary statistics for the number of country 
episodes, the median inflation rate and the median stock price response for the high and 
moderate categories under each inflation classification scheme.  The fourth row identifies 
the number of country episodes for which the stock-price change over the two-month-
announcement window is less than the country-specific median two-month stock price 
change. 
The last row of Table I reports the two-sided p-value of observing, at most, the 
corresponding number of two-month stock-price responses below their country-specific 
median two-month percentage stock-price change.  The sign tests are significant at the 
one percent level for the high-inflation episodes under all three inflation classification 
schemes.  The sign tests are never significant for the moderate-inflation episodes.  These 
sign tests should be treated with caution, because they are based on raw returns.  
However, the consistency of the findings suggests that more careful measurements of the 
stock market response to stabilizing high versus moderate inflation may not be overly 
sensitive to any particular classification scheme.  For brevity and comparability to 
previous work, the next section of the paper estimates the stock market response to 
stabilization conditional on inflation being high or moderate in the sense of Easterly 
(1996) and Bruno and Easterly (1998). 
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II.  Methodology and Results 
Under the assumption that markets are efficient, a country’s stock market index 
will adjust to information about changes in expected future profits or discount rates.  
Measuring the response of share prices to inflation stabilization events enables us to infer 
whether the expected net benefits of stabilizing inflation are positive or negative. 
Following Stulz, Kho, and Lee (2000), the international capital asset pricing 
model is used to measure the expected return on each country’s stock market index.  The 
abnormal return associated with a stabilization event is the residual from this model.  
This implies a stochastic return generating process for country of the following form 
that is possibly affected by inflation stabilization events: 
i
,                                                         (2) 
where  is the real return in dollars on country i ’s stock market index in month t,   is 
the real return in dollars on the Morgan Stanley Capital Market Index (MSCI) world 
stock market index in month t,   is a dummy variable that is equal to one in high-
inflation-stabilization months [0, +1] in country , and   is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one in moderate-inflation-stabilization months [0, +1] in country 
.  The constant intercept term, , implicitly assumes perfect capital market integration.
i
i 2   
Alternative specifications that allow for country-specific intercepts are also examined and 
yield similar results.  
The usual assumption that  is a serially uncorrelated, random error term 
requires further discussion.  Equation (2) is estimated using Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (FGLS).  An assumption of no serial correlation in stock returns could be 
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justified on the grounds of rational expectations, but the estimation procedure will allow 
for the possibility of serial correlation.  The estimation procedure also allows for 
heteroscedasticity across countries.  However, with an unbalanced panel, it is not possible 
to relax the assumption of no contemporaneous correlation of the error term across 
countries.  Therefore, a number of indirect precautions are taken.   
First, short estimation windows are used in all of the central results; the 
assumption that country abnormal returns are not contemporaneously correlated is 
reasonable if event windows do not overlap in calendar time and overlaps occur less 
frequently with short windows.  The HIGH and MODERATE stabilization dummies are 
on for two-month windows, [0, +1].  Estimates using one-month windows, [0], are also 
provided.  Second, I investigated the extent to which contemporaneous correlation is 
likely to be a problem with short windows.  With two-month estimation windows, 29 of 
the 162 event periods overlap.  With one-month estimation windows, 11 of the 81 event 
periods overlap.  These numbers suggest that a small fraction of the abnormal returns 
from (2) will potentially be affected by contemporaneous correlation.  Third, two of the 
alternative regression specifications to equation (2) will estimate abnormal returns 
relative to the IFC’s emerging stock market index.  Since all of the sample countries are 
emerging markets, the inclusion of a composite emerging market index as a right-hand-
side variable will partially control for contemporaneously correlated disturbance terms.  
Including the emerging market index does not change the results. 
Equation (2) constrains the coefficient on HIGH to be the same across all months.  
Thus, the parameter  measures the average monthly stock market response to all 
attempted stabilizations of high inflation.  Similarly,  measures the average monthly 
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response to all attempted stabilizations of moderate inflation.  Since the dummy variable 
for the event window is two-months long, the total stock market response to each type of 
stabilization attempt is given by two times the parameter estimate.  A different estimation 
technique would be to use a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).  This approach would 
have the advantage of providing a unique coefficient estimate for each country for each 
event.  However, there are also several disadvantages to this approach.  First, the low 
power of hypothesis tests in unconstrained systems severely weakens the ability of the 
event study methodology to detect the impact of the event.  Second, SUR requires a 
balanced panel.  Due to the limited time series availability of stock market data, creating 
a balanced panel would result in discarding almost half of the 81 stabilization events.  
Given data limitations, the pooled cross-section time series framework seems appropriate. 
 
A.   Responses to Disinflation Announcements: High Vs. Moderate Inflation 
 
In order to isolate the effects of disinflation, Panel A of Table II presents 
estimates of HIGH and MODERATE.  The first row presents estimates from the 
benchmark specification given by equation (2).  Heteroscedastic-consistent standard 
errors are reported in parentheses.  The estimated coefficient on HIGH is 0.121 and is 
significant at the one-percent level.  This means that the stock market increases by an 
average of 12.1 percent per month in real dollar terms when governments announce their 
intention to stabilize high inflation.  Therefore, the total stock market increase associated 
with the HIGH announcement window is 24.2 percent in real dollar terms.  The estimated 
coefficient on MODERATE is 0.001 and is not statistically significant.  Therefore, the 
stock market response to disinflation announcements is not significantly different from 0, 
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when inflation is moderate.  The column labeled “P-Value of HIGH > MODERATE” 
shows that the p-value for a test that the coefficient on HIGH equals the coefficient on 
MODERATE is 0.01.  Therefore, the coefficient on HIGH is significantly larger than the 
coefficient on MODERATE. 
Table II also presents estimates of HIGH and MODERATE using alternative 
specifications.  Row 2 presents estimates that use real U.S. stock returns, , in place of 
W
tR  in equation (2).  Row 3 presents estimates that use the real dollar return on the IFC 
Emerging Market index, , in place of WtR .  Row 4 presents estimates that use all 
three sets of returns simultaneously.  As an alternative to the market model in equation 
(2), Row 5 presents estimates based on simple mean-adjusted abnormal returns: 
.                                                                      (3) 
As a final specification, Row 6 presents estimates using a statistical model in which 
mean-returns may differ across countries by allowing for country-specific intercept 
terms: 
.                                                                     (4) 
Letting the intercept terms vary across countries allows for the possibility that average 
expected returns may differ across countries due to imperfect capital integration.3
 The central result is the same under all six specifications.  The stock market 
responds positively and significantly to the announcement of programs directed at 
stabilizing high inflation, with the average effect ranging from 11.3 to 12.2 percent per 
month.  Thus, the total effect is between 22.6 and 24.4 percent.  The response to 
announcements directed at stabilizing moderate inflation is small and never significant.  
The estimate of HIGH is always significantly larger than the estimate of MODERATE.  
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Panel B of Table II also presents estimates based on month [0] only.  These estimates 
closely match the month [0, +1] estimates.  In some cases, the month [0] estimate is 
smaller than the month [0, +1] estimate, which suggests that not all of price change is 
captured in month [0]. 
As a final robustness check, the analysis explores whether the results are sensitive 
to whether real returns are measured in dollars or local currency units.  The potential 
problem is that in high-inflation countries, the rate of depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate may not keep pace with inflation.  If inflation exceeds the rate of nominal 
depreciation, then the currency is appreciating in real terms, which means that the real 
dollar value of the stock market may become artificially inflated.  In order to see whether 
the results in Table II are driven by real appreciation of the local currency vis-à-vis the 
dollar, all of the regressions were re-estimated using real local currency returns instead of 
real dollar returns as the left-hand-side variable.  The results were virtually identical to 
the estimates that use dollar-denominated returns. 
 
B.  Are the Differences Driven by Market Anticipation? 
 
When inflation is moderate, the stock price adjustment may occur in the months 
leading up to the disinflation announcement.  Since the estimates in Table II measure the 
price response in the month of the disinflation announcement only, they may overstate 
the gap between the point estimates of HIGH and MODERATE.  To explore this 
possibility, I use equation (2) to estimate abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal 
returns for the 12 months prior to the announcement of disinflation programs directed at 
high and moderate inflation. 
Two important caveats are in order.  First, an event window of this length may 
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contain major events unrelated to disinflation.  The estimates do not control for this 
possibility.  Second, with long estimation windows, the problem of overlapping event 
windows is likely to be more severe and the standard errors are, therefore, more subject 
to problems stemming from cross-country correlation in the error term.  Keeping these 
limitations in mind, the numbers may be useful in providing a crude sense of whether the 
market anticipates disinflation announcements. 
Panel A of Table III presents the results.  There is no substantial run-up in prices 
preceding high-inflation announcements.  The cumulative abnormal return from month 
12 to –1 is close to 0.  In the case of moderate inflation, the market experiences a 
cumulative drop of about 16 percent.  Panel B presents estimates using equation (4).  The 
results are the same.  The fall in prices is consistent with the view that stabilization of 
moderate inflation is a negative net present value event for shareholders and the market 
anticipates these events.  This fact reinforces the differences between high and moderate 
inflation evident in Table II. 
 
C.  Are the Differences Driven by Differences in Disinflation Policies? 
 
The evidence in Sections II.A. and II.B. suggests two key results.  The stock 
market responds positively and significantly when a country announces its intention to 
reduce high inflation.  There is no significant market response if the pre-stabilization 
inflation rate is moderate.  It is important to know whether these results are driven by 
variation in the types of policies used to reduce high versus moderate inflation.  The 
uniformity of IMF programs suggests that there are not major differences between the 
packages of stabilization policies pursued in IMF-sponsored attempts at stabilizing high 
and moderate inflation.  However, 12 of the 81 stabilization episodes studied in this paper 
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did not involve an official agreement with the IMF.  All 12 of these programs were 
directed at stabilizing high inflation.  In eight of these 12 episodes, the countries involved 
attempted to stabilize inflation by fixing the nominal exchange rate.  In contrast, none of 
the IMF episodes involved exchange-rate-based stabilizations (ERBS).  Therefore, it is 
important to investigate whether the differential stock market responses are driven by 
differences between IMF and non-IMF stabilization policies.   
Three robustness checks suggest that this is not the case.  First, the average stock 
market response to the announcement of an ERBS is statistically indistinguishable from 
the average response to the announcement of a non-ERBS.  Second, the difference 
between the average stock market response to disinflation announcements during high 
and moderate inflation remains economically and statistically significant when the non-
IMF-sponsored programs are excluded from the high inflation sample.  Third, there is no 
significant difference between the average stock market reaction to the attempted 
stabilization of high inflation in the IMF and non-IMF subsamples.  Subsections II.C.1 
and II.C.2 provide the details about these robustness checks. 
 
C.1.  Are the High Results Due to Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilizations? 
There is an extensive literature on inflation stabilization in developing countries, 
which demonstrates that countries experience output booms when they reduce inflation 
by fixing the nominal exchange rate (Calvo and Végh (1998), Fischer et al. (2002), Végh 
(1992)).  All of the ERBS episodes in this paper were implemented during high-inflation 
regimes.  Therefore, this subsection investigates whether the positive and significant 
stock market response to disinflation announcements during high inflation is unique to 
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ERBS, or is a more general outcome associated with stabilizing high inflation.   
In order to address this issue, the 25 attempts at stabilizing high inflation are split 
into two groups: those that were exchange-rate-based and those that were not.  A total of 
eight of these 25 episodes are identified as exchange-rate-based stabilizations by Calvo 
and Végh (1998) and Fischer et al. (2002).  After separating these two kinds of 
stabilizations, the following panel regression is estimated: 
,                                                             (5) 
where  is a dummy variable that equals 1 in months [0, +1] of all non-
exchange-rate-based attempts at stabilizing high inflation, and   is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 in months [0, +1] of all exchange-rate-based attempts at stabilizing 
high inflation. 
Panel A of Table IV shows that the estimated coefficients on ERBS range from 
10.5 to 15.2 percent per month, and all are significant at the one-percent level.  The point 
estimates of the coefficient on NONERBS range from 10.2 to 12.1 percent per month and 
are also significant at the one-percent level.  The column labeled “P-Value of 
ERBS>NONERBS” shows that the p-value for an F-test that the coefficient on ERBS is 
significantly different from the coefficient on NONERBS is not significant for any 
specification in Table IV.  Therefore, the point estimates of ERBS are statistically 
indistinguishable from those for NONERBS. 
The evidence in Table IV, taken together with the evidence in Table II, suggests 
that the stock market responds more favorably to the announcement of stabilization 
programs directed at high inflation than to those directed at moderate inflation, regardless 
of whether the stabilization program is exchange-rate-based or not.  Thus, the stock 
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market evidence also supports the finding that output booms are not limited to exchange-
rate-based stabilizations of high inflation (Easterly (1996)).  However, this point should 
not be overstated, because the results are based on relatively few observations (25 total, 
eight ERBS). 
 
C.2.  Are the High Results Driven by Differences in IMF and Non-IMF Programs? 
Two additional sets of empirical tests suggest that the differential stock market 
responses are not driven by differences between IMF and non-IMF stabilization policies.  
For brevity, only the results are reported—no tables are presented.  First, the stock market 
response to high and moderate inflation announcements were re-estimated, excluding the 
non-IMF-sponsored programs from the high inflation sample.  Specifically, a new 
dummy variable called IMFHIGH was created.  This variable takes on the value one, just 
in those cases where attempts to stabilize high inflation were announced through an 
official IMF agreement.  The coefficient on IMFHIGH was positive, significant, and 
significantly different than the coefficient on MODERATE.  Thus, the difference 
between the average stock market response to high and moderate inflation 
announcements remains economically and statistically significant when the non-IMF-
sponsored programs are excluded from the high inflation sample. 
Second, estimations were performed to compare the mean response of the stock 
market to IMF and non-IMF sponsored attempts at stabilizing high inflation.  The 
coefficients on IMFHIGH and NONIMFHIGH were both positive and significant.  
However, the hypothesis that IMFHIGH=NONIMFHIGH could not be rejected.  Thus, 
the evidence suggests that there is no significant difference between the average stock 
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market reaction high inflation announcements in the IMF and non-IMF subsamples.  
Overall, the evidence in this subsection and in II.C.1 suggest that the central empirical 
result is not driven by differences in the way countries attempt to stabilize high versus 
moderate inflation. 
 
III.  Does the Stock Market Get It Right? 
This section of the paper asks whether the stock market rationally forecasts 
stabilization outcomes.  The analysis employs three approaches.  The first approach 
examines if controlling for previous failed stabilizations strengthens the positive 
relationship between the stock market response and the ex-ante inflation rate.  The second 
approach asks whether the stock market responses to disinflation announcements help 
predict future changes in inflation.  The third approach explores whether the market 
responses help predict future changes in GDP growth. 
 
A.  Stock Market Responses and Ex-Ante Inflation Rates Revisited  
 If the stock market is rational, then it may assign a lower probability of success to 
a disinflation program that is announced on the heels of a failed program.  A lower 
probability of success will decrease the stock market response to news of stabilization.  
Therefore, a low probability of success may explain why the stock price change is close 
to zero for a number of high-inflation episodes in Figure 1.  This discussion suggests that 
the relationship between the stock market response and ex-ante inflation after controlling 
for past failures should be stronger than the unconditional relationship documented in 
Section I.A.1.  Two approaches speak to the issue.   
First, I re-estimate equation (1).  This time I interact the inflation rate with a 
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variable called PREVFAIL.  The variable PREVFAIL is equal to one if there was a failed 
stabilization in the previous 24 months (robust t-statistics in parentheses 2R =0.22, 
N=81): 
               (6) 
                                               (0.9)    (3.6)                (-2.6).                                                     
 
The conditional relationship between the stock market change and the average pre-
stabilization inflation rate is stronger than the unconditional one.  Relative to equation 
(1), the coefficient on INFL in equation (6) is higher, the robust t-statistic is larger, and 
the R-squared is bigger.  The interactive term, INFL*PREVFAIL, also has the expected 
negative sign and is significant.   
As a second pass at the data, Figure 2 plots the announcement-window stock price 
response versus the average 12-month inflation rate for only those episodes that were not 
preceded by a failed stabilization in the previous 24 months.  There are 41 such episodes.  
Figure 2 and equation (7) below exhibit a tighter linear relationship between the stock 
price change and inflation than Figure 1 and equation (1), which do not control for past 
failures.  The trend line in Figure 2 is given by the following equation (robust t-statistics 
in parentheses 2R =0.48, N=41): 
                                                          (7) 
                                                (-0.9)  (4.7).   
The outlier in the upper right hand corner of Figure 2 is Peru.  In 1989 and 1990 
the average inflation rate in Peru was 344 percent.  Real GDP fell by 12.3 percent in 1989 
and 5.5 percent in 1990.  In August of 1990, Alberto Fujimori was inaugurated as the 
new prime minister and announced a sweeping stabilization program, which came to be 
known as “Fujishock.”  The stock market increased by 100 percent in real dollar terms 
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between August and September.  In 1991, inflation fell to 44 percent and real GDP grew 
by 6.7 percent.  The positive linear relationship in Figure 2 remains significant if Peru is 
removed. 
 
B.  Do the Stock Market Responses Predict Future Changes in Inflation? 
 To the extent that stock market responses to the announcement of a disinflation 
program predict the expected net benefit that will accrue to shareholders as a result of 
reducing inflation, they should be negatively associated with future changes in inflation.  
Figure 3 examines whether the data support this prediction.  The variable on the y-axis is 
the change in inflation: the average 12-month inflation rate in the year after the 
disinflation announcement minus the average 12-month inflation rate in the two years 
prior to the announcement.  The variable on the x-axis is the cumulative stock market 
response over the months [0, +1].  The trend line in Figure 3 is given by the following 
equation (robust t-statistics in parentheses 2R =0.05, N=81): 
 
                                                       (8) 
                 (-1.2)   (-2.2).                    
 
 
Stock price responses to disinflation announcements have some unconditional 
predictive power for what will happen to inflation in the year following stabilization 
efforts. 
 
C.  Do the Stock Market Responses Predict Future GDP Growth? 
 To the extent that stock market responses capitalize the expected net output 
benefits of reducing inflation, they should be positively associated with future 
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innovations in GDP growth.  Put another way, the unexpected change in the stock market 
should reflect the “news” about future GDP growth.  If the sample mean of a country’s 
growth rate is taken as a proxy of its expected future growth rate, then the deviation of 
GDP growth from its country-specific sample mean is a metric of the news in GDP 
growth.   
 Figure 4 compares the average deviation of real GDP growth in years [0, +3] with 
the average deviation over the pre-stabilization period (years [-3, -1]), for all high 
inflation episodes.  Region B, the area above the average pre-stabilization deviation, is 
substantially larger than Region A, the area below.  Figure 5 compares the average 
deviation in stabilization years [0, +3] with the average deviation over the pre-
stabilization period, for all episodes of attempted stabilizations of moderate inflation.  In 
this figure, Region B is not substantially larger than Region A.  Overall, the comparisons 
appear at least roughly consistent with the discounted evidence provided by the stock 
market (Table II). 
Figure 6 plots the GDP news measure versus the unexpected stock price change.  
The graph suggests that the stock market has predictive power.  The corresponding 
regression confirms the statistical significance of the apparent relationship (robust t-
statistics in parentheses 2R =0.09, N=81): 
                                   (9) 
                                   (-1.0)    (2.9).      
Equation (9) indicates that, on average, a 100 percent stock price response to the 
announcement of a disinflation predicts GDP growth in the following year that is 4.76 
percentage points above its sample mean.  This equation should not be given a causal 
interpretation.  It does not say that the unexpected stock market change causes growth. 
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 IV.  Discussion 
This paper uses the stock market to answer a fundamental question: Do the 
benefits of disinflation outweigh the costs?  Contractionary measures taken to reduce 
inflation may raise discount rates and reduce profits in the short run.  But reducing 
inflation may increase future profits and reduce discount rates.  The stock market 
removes the time dimension of the analysis by collapsing the entire future stream of 
disinflation costs and benefits into a single summary statistic: the expected net present 
value of the program to shareholders. 
In contrast to the net present value analysis introduced in this paper, sacrifice-
ratio analyses of disinflation focus exclusively on the cost of reducing inflation.  
Traditional wisdom holds that efforts to reduce inflation will cause a fall in output in 
accordance with the Phillips Curve.  Sacrifice-ratio analyses measure the short-run cost 
of reducing inflation as the undiscounted sum of this fall in output (Ball (1994), Fischer 
(1986), Gordon (1982), Okun (1978)).4  This approach assumes that there are long-run 
benefits to reducing inflation without making them explicit in a cost-benefit calculation.  
Therefore, sacrifice-ratio-based analyses do not tell us whether the benefits of disinflation 
outweigh the costs. 
In contrast to the traditional view, advocates of rational expectations argue that 
disinflation need not be costly if policy makers credibly commit to reducing inflation.  
Sargent (1982) provides supporting evidence for the rational expectations view.  He 
presents case studies of four countries that abruptly halted post-World War I 
hyperinflations at virtually no cost to output. 
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In fact, more recent work finds that countries may even experience output booms 
while stabilizing high inflation (Végh, 1992).  Calvo and Végh (1998) document seven 
episodes of expansionary stabilization of high inflation.  Fischer et al. (2002) document 
nine episodes.  Easterly (1996) provides broader evidence against the traditional view of 
disinflation.  He studies twenty-eight episodes of high inflation that were successfully 
stabilized and shows that output expanded on average.  In contrast to the recent evidence 
that reducing high inflation is expansionary, Dornbusch and Fischer (1993) conclude that 
moderate inflation can be reduced to low inflation only at a substantial short-term cost to 
output.5  This conclusion is based on their case study of four countries that successfully 
reduced moderate inflation to low inflation. 
Taken together, this recent evidence seems to suggest that disinflation is 
expansionary when starting from high levels of inflation, but contractionary when 
inflation is moderate.  However, these studies focus exclusively on episodes where 
inflation was successfully reduced.  Calvo and Végh (1998) argue that selection bias 
clouds the interpretation of studies that focus exclusively on episodes where inflation was 
successfully reduced, instead of all attempts at stabilizing inflation. 
To understand the theoretical content of Calvo and Végh’s argument, imagine that 
a country experiencing high inflation initiates a stabilization program.  Now suppose that 
this country experiences a favorable output shock.  The shock creates two measurement 
problems.  First, it causes an output boom, which generates a specious positive 
correlation between stabilization and output growth.  Second, the boom generates a 
windfall in tax revenue, which reduces the government’s need for inflationary finance 
and, therefore, raises the probability of a successful stabilization. 
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Figure 7 illustrates the empirical thrust of Calvo and Végh’s (1998) selection bias 
critique.  The figure plots the average deviation of annual output growth from its sample 
mean for two subsets of the high inflation episodes studied in this paper: those that were 
successfully stabilized and those that were not.6  The line corresponding to the successful 
stabilizations suggests that reducing high inflation is expansionary, but it is also 
consistent with the view that stabilizations succeed because they coincide with favorable 
exogenous shocks. 
The line corresponding to the unsuccessful stabilizations is also consistent with 
multiple interpretations.  Countries may experience recessions because (1) stabilization 
policy is contractionary; (2) the government is not committed to reducing inflation; or (3) 
the economy is hit with adverse shocks.  The general message of Figure 7 is that selective 
examination of ex-post realizations of GDP growth may not accurately measure the 
expected real effects of stabilization policy.  In a world where people are rational and 
forward-looking, one ideally wants an ex-ante measure of the effect that the stabilization 
program is expected to have on current and future output.   
This paper uses the stock market to provide just such an ex-ante measure.  There 
are large expected net benefits to stabilizing high inflation the stock market increases by 
24 percent in real dollar terms when governments announce disinflation programs in the 
midst of high inflation.  But there are no apparent net benefits to reducing moderate 
inflation the point estimate is zero when disinflation programs are announced in the midst 
of moderate inflation, and there is even some evidence of a market decline in anticipation 
of these announcements.  Taken together, these results buttress previous findings that the 
real consequences of stabilizing high and moderate inflation are very different. 
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 V.  Alternative Interpretations and Extensions 
There are important limitations inherent in the stock market approach to 
evaluating the real effects of disinflation.  First, to the extent that disinflation 
announcements are anticipated, the measured unanticipated change in equity prices will 
understate the expected impact of disinflation.  Second, stock price responses measure the 
change in real wealth that accrues to domestic shareholders, not utility gains per se.7  A 
shock that drives down stock market valuation may actually be welfare improving.  For 
example, a rise in expected future productivity can decrease stock market value if the 
discount rate rises by more than the increase in expected future dividends (Lucas, 1978).  
Nevertheless, welfare improves.   
Third, the stock market provides a cost-benefit analysis of current and expected 
future profits.  This is not the same thing as a cost-benefit analysis of current and 
expected future output.  Therefore, the results speak only to shareholder gains and losses.  
We cannot make broader inferences about social welfare.  For example, stabilizing 
moderate inflation may generate private benefits for nonshareholders, even if it is of little 
consequence to shareholders.  There may also be public benefits from reducing moderate 
inflation that are not captured in stock prices.  Conversely, whereas shareholders benefit 
from stabilizing high inflation, the results do not necessarily imply that nonshareholders 
are also better off.  If stabilizing high inflation increases capital’s share in GDP, then 
stock prices may rise with no change (or even a fall) in expected future output. 
Bearing these limitations in mind, the stock market data provide comprehensive 
evidence that efforts directed at reducing high inflation have different real implications 
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than those directed at reducing moderate inflation.  Future research should try and 
uncover the underlying mechanisms responsible for these differences. 
It would be useful to know how much of the observed stock market responses are 
due to changes in discount rates versus profits.  One approach might be to look at data on 
total market dividends and dividend yields.  These data would allow one to decompose 
the stock market responses into changes in discount rates and cash flows using the 
dividend discount model as in Blanchard (1993) and Fama and French (2000).  
Unfortunately, these data are not available for the entire sample period in all countries.  It 
would also be helpful to know which of the following drives the central result: a 
difference in net benefits, conditional on success, or differing probabilities of success.  
The current evidence is silent on this issue.   
Other factors for which the analysis is unable to control may also drive the 
observed differences in stock market responses.  For example, a detailed study of the tax 
systems of the 21 countries in the sample lies outside the scope of this paper, but the way 
in which inflation interacts with the taxation of financial assets may drive the observed 
differences between high and moderate inflation (Feldstein, 1980).  Another possibility is 
that stabilizing high inflation may signal future macroeconomic reforms, whereas 
stabilizing moderate inflation does not (Bruno and Easterly (1996), Collins (1990)).  If 
that is the case, then the stock market may respond more favorably to disinflation 
announcements during high inflation, even if there are no substantial differences in the 
expected real effects of stabilizing high versus moderate inflation per se. 
Using short event windows reduces the chance that the results are contaminated 
by major events that are unrelated to stabilization, but even a short window does not 
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entirely eliminate the concern.  The evidence relating the stock market responses to future 
changes in inflation and GDP growth is also subject to a similar critique. 
The potential for reverse causality also merits discussion.  If strong economic 
performance drives policy-makers to initiate stabilization programs, then the estimated 
stock market response to attempts at stabilizing high inflation may be upward biased.  
The pre-stabilization-window evidence (Table III) and the data on GDP growth (Figures 
4 and 5) do not suggest reverse causality, but the possibility cannot be dismissed.   
Finally, all of the moderate inflation episodes are identified using IMF 
agreements.  Section I of the paper provides evidence that suggests that IMF stabilization 
programs are tantamount to traditional disinflation programs.  Suppose, however, that 
inflation reduction is not a major objective of IMF programs in economies experiencing 
moderate inflation.  In this case, the results suggest that IMF programs are of no value to 
domestic shareholders when inflation stabilization is not a principal objective. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
In spite of the limitations, we learn a lot by using financial data to study important 
macroeconomic issues.  The traditional view says that disinflation is costly, because 
reducing inflation causes a fall in output in accordance with the Phillips Curve.  The 
rational expectations view says that disinflation need not be costly if policy makers 
credibly commit to reducing inflation.  The stock market approach underscores the 
myopia inherent in both views.  The paramount issue is not whether disinflation is costly 
in the short run, but whether the benefits of disinflation outweigh the costs. 
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Figure 1.  The Stock Market Response to Disinflation Announcements as a Function of 
Inflation at the Time of the Announcement
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Figure 2.  The Stock Market Response to Disinflation Announcements as a Function of 
Inflation at the Time of Announcement: No Failed Disinflations in Previous 24 months
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Figure 3.  The  Stock Market Responses Predict Changes in Future Inflation
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Figure 4.   Average Deviation of Real GDP Growth From Country-Specific Sample Mean: All 
Attempted Stabilizations of High Inflation
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Figure 5.   Average Deviation of Real GDP Growth From Country-Specific Sample Mean: All 
Attempted Stabilizations of Moderate Inflation
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Figure 6. The  Stock Market Responses Predict Changes in Future GDP Growth 
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
-60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Stock Market Response to the Disinflation Announcement 
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
G
D
P
 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
Y
e
a
r
 
A
f
t
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
A
n
n
o
u
n
c
e
m
e
n
t
 40
Figure 7. Successful Stabilizations of High Inflation are Associated with Output Booms; 
Failed Stabilizations of High Inflation Are Not 
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Table I 
The Median Stock Price Response to Disinflation Announcements during Episodes of High Inflation Exceeds the Median Stock Price 
Response to Disinflation Announcements during Episodes of Moderate Inflation 
 
Table I divides the 81 stabilization episodes into three groups based on levels of average inflation prior to announcement.  The first grouping corresponds to the Bruno Easterly 
(1998) classification of high versus moderate inflation; the second simply divides the total sample into two groups of equal size: high and moderate inflation.  The third comparison 
splits the sample into three groups of equal size: high, moderate, and low inflation.  The first three rows provide summary statistics for each grouping: the number of episodes, the 
median inflation rate and the median stock price response for the high and moderate categories under each inflation classification scheme.  The fourth row reports the number of 
episodes for which the stock price change over the two-month-announcement window is less than the median (country-specific) two-month stock price change. The last row 
reports the two-sided p-value of observing at most the corresponding number of stock price responses to stabilization below the median (country-specific) two-month percentage 
change in the stock price.   
    
 Bruno Easterly Classification Two-Way Numerical Split Three-Way Numerical Split
        
 High    Moderate    High Moderate High   Moderate     Low 
Number of 
Episodes 
25 56 40 41 27 27 27 
        
Median Inflation 118 15 77 11 116 26 10 
        
Median Stock 
Price Change 
16 1 14 1 15 11 1 
        
Number Negative 6 25 11 20 7 10 14 
        
P-Value 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.12 0.65 
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Table II 
The Average Stock Price Response to Disinflation Announcements during Episodes of High Inflation Exceeds the Average Stock 
Price Response to Disinflation Announcements during Episodes of Moderate Inflation 
The left-hand-side variable is real, dollar-denominated stock returns.  The estimation procedure is feasible generalized least squares.  Heteroscedastic-consistent 
standard errors are given in parentheses.  The classification of high and moderate inflation follows Bruno and Easterly (1998) as described in the text.  The column 
labeled Month [0,+1] presents estimates of HIGH and MODERATE using the two-month announcement window described in the text.  The column labeled Month 
[0] presents estimates of HIGH and MODERATE using the one-month announcement window described in the text.  The first row presents estimates of HIGH and 
MODERATE from the benchmark specification using a World stock return index.  Row 2 presents estimates of HIGH and MODERATE from a specification that 
uses U.S. stock returns in place of a World stock return index in equation (3).  Row 3 presents estimates that use the IFC Emerging Market index.  Row 4 presents 
estimates that use all three sets of returns simultaneously.  Row 5 presents estimates of HIGH and MODERATE based on simple mean-adjusted abnormal returns.  
Row 6 presents estimates using a statistical model, which allows for country-specific intercept terms.  The column labeled P-Value of HIGH>MODERATE shows 
the p-value for a test that the coefficient on HIGH is significantly larger than the coefficient on MODERATE.  The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the one percent, five percent, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively. 
  
Panel A: Month [0, +1] Estimates 
  
Panel B: Month [0] Estimates 
 
 
 
 
Controls 
 
HIGH 
 
MODERATE 
 
P-Value of 
HIGH> 
MODERATE 
 
  
HIGH 
 
MODERATE 
 
P-Value of 
HIGH> 
MODERATE 
        
World Returns 0.121*** 
(0.023) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.00  0.126*** 
(0.032) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
0.00 
        
U.S. Returns 0.119*** 
(0.023) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.00  0.121*** 
(0.032) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
0.00 
        
LDC Returns 0.113*** 
(0.026) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
0.00  0.081** 
(0.037) 
0.008 
(0.02) 
0.08 
        
All Returns 0.114*** 
(0.026) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
0.00  0.080** 
(0.037) 
0.006 
(0.02) 
0.07 
        
Constant-
Mean Return 
0.122*** 
(0.023) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.00  0.124*** 
(0.032) 
-0.003 
(0.01) 
0.00 
        
Country-
Specific 
Mean Return 
0.122*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.00  0.122*** 
(0.033) 
-0.003 
(0.01) 
0.00 
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Table III 
The Stock Market Falls in Anticipation of Disinflation Announcements Made During Episodes of Moderate Inflation 
 
The abbreviation AR stands for abnormal return.  The abnormal return for month [n] is defined as the coefficient on a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 in nth 
month before implementation of the stabilization.  The abnormal returns in Panel A are calculated using regression equation (3) in the text.  The abnormal returns in Panel B 
are generated using regression equation (4) in the text.   
    
 Panel A: World-Return Model  Panel B: Constant-Mean-Return Model 
         
  High Inflation  Moderate Inflation  High Inflation  Moderate Inflation 
Month 
Relative to 
Stabilization 
 
 
AR CAR 
 
AR CAR 
 
AR CAR 
 
AR CAR 
-12  -.036 -.036  -.008 -.008  -.038 -.038  -.010 -.010 
             
-11  -.033 -.069  -.018 -.026  -.033 -.070  -.016 -.026 
             
-10  -.053 -.122  -.012 -.038  -.050 -.121  -.014 -.040 
             
-9  .007 -.116  -.010 -.048  .002 -.119  -.012 -.052 
             
-8  -.005 -.121  -.007 -.054  -.003 -.122  -.007 -.058 
             
-7  .027 -.094  .011 -.043  .028 -.094  .012 -.047 
             
-6  .042 -.052  -.020 -.063  .043 -.051  -.019 -.065 
             
-5  .035 -.018  -.023 -.086  .037 -.014  -.024 -.090 
             
-4  -.005 -.022  -.030 -.116  -.004 -.018  -.030 -.120 
             
-3  .057 .035  -.026 -.142  .060 .041  -.026 -.146 
             
-2  -.028 .006  -.008 -.150  -.025 .016  -.007 -.153 
             
-1  -.030 -.023  -.014 -.163  -.032 -.016  -.013 -.166 
             
0  .088 .064  -.008 -.172  .085 .069  -.007 -.173 
             
1  .126 .190  .011 -.161  .127 .196  .011 -.162 
 
Table IV 
The Average Stock Market Response to Announcements of Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilizations (ERBS) Is Not 
Significantly Larger Than the Average Stock Market Response to Non-Exchange-Rate Based Stabilizations (NONERBS) 
The left-hand-side variable is real, dollar-denominated stock returns.  The estimation procedure is feasible generalized least squares.  Heteroscedastic-
consistent standard errors are given in parentheses.  The column labeled Month [0, +1] presents estimates of the stock market response to exchange-rate-
based and non-exchange-rate-based stabilizations of high inflation using the two-month announcement window described in the text.  The column labeled 
Month [0] presents estimates of ERBS and NONERBS using the one-month announcement window described in the text.  The first row presents estimates 
using the benchmark specification using a World stock return index.  Row 2 presents estimates of ERBS and NONERBS from a specification that uses U.S. 
stock returns in place of the World stock return index in equation (5).  Row 3 presents estimates of ERBS and NONERBS from a specification that uses the 
IFC Emerging Market index.  Row 4 presents estimates of ERBS and NONERBS from a specification that uses all three sets of returns simultaneously.  Row 
5 presents estimates based on simple mean-adjusted abnormal returns.  Row 6 presents estimates using a statistical model, which allows for country-specific 
intercept terms.  The column labeled P-Value of ERBS>NONERBS shows the p-value for a test that the stock market response to exchange-rate-based 
stabilizations of high inflation is significantly different from the stock market response to non-exchange-rate-based stabilizations of high inflation.  The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the one percent, five percent, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively. 
            
 Panel A: Month [0, +1] Estimates  Panel B: Month [0] Estimates 
  
 
Exchange-
Rate-Based 
Stabilization 
  
Non 
Exchange-
Rate-Based 
Stabilization 
  
 
P-Value of 
ERBS>NON 
ERBS 
  
 
Exchange-
Rate-Based 
Stabilization
  
Non 
Exchange-
Rate-Based 
Stabilization
  
 
P-Value of 
ERBS>NON 
ERBS 
            
World 0.152*** 
(0.037) 
 0.102***
(0.029) 
 0.28  0.154***
(0.052) 
 0.109*** 
(0.041) 
 0.49 
            
U.S. 0.148*** 
(0.037) 
 0.100***
(0.029) 
 0.31  0.146***
(0.052) 
 0.106*** 
(0.041) 
 0.55 
            
LDC 0.105*** 
(0.04) 
 0.121***
(0.034) 
 0.77  0.039 
(0.055) 
 0.113** 
(0.049) 
 0.308 
            
All 0.122*** 
(0.034) 
 0.105***
(0.04) 
 0.75  0.035 
(0.055) 
 0.116** 
(0.049) 
 0.27 
            
Constant-
Mean 
0.152*** 
(0.037) 
 0.102***
(0.029) 
 0.29  0.151***
(0.052) 
 0.108*** 
(0.041 
 0.52 
            
Country-
Mean 
0.150*** 
(0.037) 
 0.103***
(0.029) 
 0.32  0.149***
(0.052) 
 0.106*** 
(0.042) 
 0.52 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 lists the information used to identify the disinflation announcements referred to in the text. 
Table A1 
Characteristics of Inflation Stabilization Programs in Emerging Economies with Stock Markets 
Each panel of Table A1 corresponds to a given country.  Column 1 identifies the country to which each panel applies.  Column 2 enumerates the month and year 
of all the disinflation announcements that occurred in each of the countries during the sample period (the period for which stock market data are available for 
each country).  Columns 3 and 4 indicate how the stabilization dates in Column 2 were identified.  A “Yes” in a given row of column 3 indicates that the date in 
the corresponding row of Column 1 is the starting date for a Calvo and Végh (1998) stabilization episode.  A “Yes” in a given row of column 4 indicates that an 
official agreement was signed with the IMF.  The type of IMF agreement is given in parentheses.  SB denotes a Stand-By agreement and EFF denotes an 
Extended Fund Facility agreement.  See Schadler et al. (1995) for a detailed discussion of these agreements.  Column 5 indicates the level of inflation at the time 
the program was announced.  A “Yes” in Column 5 indicates that the country was experiencing high inflation.  A “Yes” in Column 6 indicates that there was a 
stabilization program in the previous 24 months.  A “Yes” in Column 7 indicates that there was a stabilization program in the subsequent 24 months.  A “Yes” in 
Column 8 indicates that the stabilization program was successful.  In keeping with the spirit of the Bruno and Easterly (1996) definition of high inflation, a 
stabilization program implemented in the midst of high inflation is defined as successful if (prior to the announcement of another stabilization program) 
annualized monthly inflation falls below 40 percent and remains below 40 percent for two or more years.  In accordance with Dornbusch and Fischer (1993) and 
Burton and Fischer (1998), a stabilization program announced in the midst of moderate inflation is defined as successful if annualized monthly inflation falls 
below 10 percent and remains below 10 percent for two or more years.  A “Yes” in Column 9 indicates that the stabilization program was exchange-rate-based 
according to Calvo and Végh (1998) and Fischer et al. (2002). 
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Country 
 
 
 
Date of 
Stabilization 
Program 
 
 
 
 
Episodic 
 
 
 
 
IMF 
Agreement?
 
 
High 
Inflation 
Crisis? 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Previous 24 
Months? 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Following 
24 Months? 
 
 
 
Stabilization
Successful? 
 
 
Exchange
Rate 
Based? 
Panel A: 
Argentina 
        
 Aug 1976  Yes (SB) Yes  Yes   
         
 Sept 1977  Yes (SB) Yes Yes Yes   
         
 Dec 1978 Yes (Tablita)  Yes Yes   Yes 
         
 Jun 1983  Yes (SB) Yes  Yes   
         
 Dec 1984  Yes (SB) Yes Yes Yes   
         
 Jun 1985 Yes (Austral)  Yes Yes   Yes 
         
 Jul 1987  Yes (SB) Yes Yes    
         
 Nov 1989 Yes (Bonex)  Yes Yes Yes   
         
 Apr 1991 Yes 
(Convertibility) 
Yes (SB) Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
         
 Mar 1992  Yes (EFF)  Yes    
Table A1 - Continued 
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
 
Date of 
Stabilization 
Program 
 
 
 
 
Episodic 
 
 
 
IMF 
Agreement?
 
 
High 
Inflation 
Crisis? 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Previous 24 
Months? 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Following 
24 Months? 
 
 
 
Stabilization
Successful? 
 
 
Exchange
Rate 
Based? 
Panel B: 
Brazil 
        
 Mar 1983  Yes (SB) Yes     
         
 Feb 1986 Yes (Cruzado)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
 Jul 1987 Yes (Bresser)  Yes Yes Yes   
         
 Aug 1988  Yes (SB) Yes Yes Yes   
         
 Jan 1989 Yes (Summer)  Yes Yes Yes   
         
 Apr 1990 Yes (Collor)  Yes Yes Yes   
         
 Jan 1992  Yes (SB) Yes Yes    
         
 Mar 1994 Yes (Real)  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 
 
Panel C: 
Chile 
        
 Feb 1978 Yes (Tablita)  Yes   Yes Yes 
         
 Jan 1983  Yes (SB)      
         
 Aug 1985  Yes (EFF)      
         
 Nov 1989  Yes (SB)    Yes  
         
         
Panel D: 
Egypt 
        
 May 1991  Yes (SB)    Yes  
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Table A1 - Continued 
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Date of 
Stabilization 
Program 
 
 
 
 
 
Episodic 
 
 
 
IMF 
Agreement?
 
 
High 
Inflation 
Crisis? 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Previous 24 
Months? 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Following 
24 Months? 
 
 
 
Stabilization
Successful? 
 
 
Exchange
Rate 
Based? 
Panel E: 
India 
        
 Nov 1981  Yes (EFF)      
         
 Jan 1991  Yes (SB)   Yes   
         
 Oct 1991  Yes (SB)  Yes    
 
 
Panel F: 
Indonesia 
        
 May 1973  Yes (SB)    Yes  
         
         
Panel G: 
Israel 
        
 Jul 1985 Yes  Yes   Yes Yes 
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Table A1 – Continued 
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Date of 
Stabilization 
Program 
 
 
 
 
 
Episodic 
 
 
 
IMF 
Agreement?
 
 
High 
Inflation 
Crisis? 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Previous 24 
Months? 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Following 
24 Months? 
 
 
 
Stabilization
Successful? 
 
 
Exchange
Rate 
Based? 
Panel H: 
Jamaica 
        
 Aug 1977  Yes (SB)   Yes   
         
 Jun 1978  Yes (EFF)  Yes Yes   
         
 Jun 1979  Yes (EFF)  Yes Yes   
         
 Apr 1981  Yes (EFF)  Yes    
         
 Jun 1984  Yes (SB)  Yes Yes   
         
 Jul 1985  Yes (SB)  Yes Yes   
         
 Mar 1987  Yes (SB)  Yes Yes   
         
 Sept 1988  Yes (SB)  Yes Yes   
         
 Mar 1990  Yes (SB)  Yes Yes   
         
 Jun 1991  Yes (SB)  Yes Yes   
         
 Dec 1992  Yes (SB) Yes Yes  Yes  
         
         
Panel I: 
Jordan 
        
 Jul 1989  Yes (SB)      
         
 Feb 1992  Yes (SB)      
         
 May 1994  Yes (EFF)      
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Table A1 – Continued 
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
 
Date of 
Stabilization 
Program 
 
 
 
 
Episodic 
 
 
 
IMF 
Agreement?
 
 
High 
Inflation 
Crisis? 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Previous 24 
Months? 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Following 
24 Months? 
 
 
 
Stabilization
Successful? 
 
 
Exchange
Rate 
Based? 
Panel J:  
Kenya 
        
 May 1993  Yes    Yes  
 
 
Panel K: 
Korea 
        
 May 1977  Yes (SB)      
         
 Mar 1980  Yes (SB)   Yes Yes  
         
 Feb 1981  Yes (SB)  Yes    
         
 Jul 1983  Yes (SB)   Yes   
         
 Jul 1985  Yes (SB)  Yes    
         
         
Panel L: 
Mexico 
        
 Jan 1977 Yes Yes (EFF)  Yes    
         
 Jan 1983  Yes (EFF)      
         
 Nov 1986  Yes (SB) Yes  Yes   
         
 Dec 1987 Yes (Pacto)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
 May 1989  Yes (EFF)      
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Table A1 – Continued 
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
 
Date of 
Stabilization 
Program 
 
 
 
 
Episodic 
 
 
 
IMF 
Agreement?
 
 
High 
Inflation 
Crisis? 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Previous 24 
Months? 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Following 
24 Months? 
 
 
 
Stabilization
Successful? 
 
 
Exchange
Rate 
Based? 
Panel M: 
Nigeria 
        
 Jan 1987  Yes (SB)      
         
 Feb 1989  Yes (SB)   Yes   
         
 Jan 1991  Yes (SB)  Yes    
 
 
Panel N: 
Pakistan  
        
 Mar 1977   Yes (SB)      
         
 Nov 1980  Yes (EFF)   Yes   
         
 Dec 1981  Yes (EFF)  Yes    
         
 Dec 1988  Yes (SB)      
         
 Sept 1993  Yes (SB)   Yes   
         
 Feb 1994  Yes (EFF)  Yes    
         
         
Panel O: 
Peru 
        
 Aug 1990 Yes  Yes     
         
 Mar 1993  Yes (EFF) Yes   Yes  
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Table A1 – Continued 
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
 
Date of 
Stabilization 
Program 
 
 
 
 
Episodic 
 
 
 
IMF 
Agreement?
 
 
High 
Inflation 
Crisis? 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Previous 24 
Months? 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Following 
24 Months? 
 
 
 
Stabilization
Successful? 
 
 
Exchange
Rate 
Based? 
Panel P: 
Philippines  
        
 Oct 1986  Yes (SB)      
         
 May 1989  Yes (EFF)   Yes   
         
 Feb 1991  Yes (SB)  Yes    
         
 Jun 1994  Yes (EFF)      
         
         
Panel Q:  
S. Africa: 
        
 Jan 1976  Yes (SB)   Yes   
         
 Aug 1976  Yes (SB)  Yes    
         
 Nov 1982  Yes (SB)      
 
 
Panel R: 
Thailand 
        
 Jul 1978  Yes (SB)      
         
 Jun 1981  Yes (SB)   Yes   
         
 Nov 1982  Yes (SB)  Yes    
         
 Jun 1985  Yes (SB)      
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Table A1 – Continued 
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
 
Date of 
Stabilization 
Program 
 
 
 
 
Episodic 
 
 
 
IMF 
Agreement?
 
 
High 
Inflation 
Crisis? 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Previous 24 
Months? 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Following 
24 Months? 
 
 
 
Stabilization
Successful? 
 
 
Exchange
Rate 
Based? 
Panel S: 
Turkey 
        
 Jul 1994  Yes (SB) Yes     
         
         
Panel T: 
Venezuela 
        
 Jun 1989  Yes (EFF)      
         
         
Panel U: 
Zimbabwe 
        
 Apr 1981  Yes (SB)   Yes   
         
 Mar 1983  Yes (SB)  Yes    
         
 Jan 1992  Yes (EFF)   Yes   
         
 Sept 1992  Yes (EFF)  Yes    
         
Total 
Number 
 
81 
 
14 
 
69 
 
25 
 
42 
 
47 
 
12 
 
8 
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1 See Agénor and Montiel (1996), p. 423.  See also, Mussa and Savastano (1999), p. 101. 
2 For conceptual discussions of the world CAPM see Frankel (1994); Stulz (1999a); Tesar (1999); Tesar 
and Werner (1995); and Tesar and Werner (1998). 
3 For surveys of the literature on imperfect capital market integration, see Stulz (1999a, b), Tesar (1999), 
Tesar and Werner (1998).  For empirical evidence on the real effects of increased capital market 
integration, see Collins (1999) and Henry (2000a, b). 
4 Dividing the output cost by the total reduction in inflation gives the sacrifice ratio.  See for example, 
Blanchard (1999), p. 368; Dornbusch and Fischer (1987), p. 528; and Mankiw (1997), p.352. 
5 See also Burton and Fischer (1998). 
6 See the data appendix for the definition of a successful stabilization. 
7 Lucas (2000) studies the welfare gains of reducing inflation. 
